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1 – Introduction 
Scientific realism would be a commonsensical philosophical 
position if there weren’t powerful counter-arguments to it, 
the most famous of which is the pessimistic meta-induction 
(PMI) argument: since past successful theories turned out 
to be false, it is unwarranted to believe that our best current 
theories are true simply because they are successful (Laudan 
1981). Some scientific realists have responded to the PMI 
argument by restricting realism to a subset of the theoretical 
entities of the theory. One particular way of doing this is ex-
planationist realism (or explanationism), according to which 
one should be a realist with respect to the working posits of 
the theory, the ones involved in explanations and predictions. 
In contrast, one does not need to commit herself to believe in 
the existence of other presuppositional posits of the theory, 
since they are somewhat ‘idle’ components (Kitcher 1995; 
Psillos 1999).  The proponents of this view have argued for 
it in the framework of classical theories (e.g. Fresnel’s theory 
of light). I think the case for explanationism is fundamentally 
incomplete if one does not consider the theory change from 
classical to quantum mechanics. In this paper, I argue that 
explanationism can be extended to the quantum framework. 
In order to show this, I discuss the different realist approach-
es to quantum mechanics, which differ in the interpretation 
of one of the fundamental objects of the theory: the wave 
function. On the one hand, according to the wave function 
ontology approach, also known as wave function realism, 
the wave function is a concrete physical entity (Albert 1996; 
Loewer 1996; Lewis 2004, 2005, 2006; Ney 2012, 2013). In 
contrast, according to the primitive ontology (PO) approach 
(Allori et al. 2008; Allori 2013), the wave function does not 
represent physical objects. I argue that the PO approach can 
provide what explanationism needs to defeat the PMI argu-
ment in the classical-to-quantum transition. The PO, and not 
the wave function, can be identified with the working posit 
of quantum theory, and as such: (1) it is primarily responsi-
ble for the success of both classical and quantum mechanics; 
and (2) it is (suitably) preserved in the classical-to-quantum 
theory change. Notice that explanationism so understood 
provides an argument in favor of the PO approach over the 
wave function ontology approach: being preserved in theory 
change, the PO defeats the PMI argument. In contrast, since 
the wave function does not have any classical analog, if wave 
function realism is true it is hard to see how the working pos-
its are preserved in the transition from classical to quantum 
mechanics. Thus, wave function realism may undermine sci-
entific realism about quantum mechanics.   
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section, I over-
view the PMI argument against scientific realism and some 
replies to it, focusing on explanationism. Then in Section 3 
I explain how the transition from classical to quantum me-
chanics is a problem for explanationism. In Sections 4 and 5 
I present the PO approach as a framework to understand fun-
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damental physical theories, I show how the PO is preserved 
through the classical-to-quantum theory change and I argue 
that it is the PO, rather than the wave function, which is re-
sponsible for the empirical success of quantum mechanics. 
In Section 7 I discuss some objections to the previous discus-
sion, and I provide some replies. Finally, in the last section I 
discuss the advantage of the PO approach over the wave func-
tion realism approach in responding to the PMI argument.
2 – The Pessimistic Meta-In-
duction and Explanationism 
Scientific realism is, roughly put, the view that scientific theo-
ries give us a (nearly) truthful description of the world. The 
main argument for scientific realism, the no-miracle argu-
ment, holds that the empirical success of a theory can, and 
should, be taken as evidence of its truth. Nonetheless, there 
are very powerful arguments against scientific realism, such 
as the pessimistic meta-induction (PMI), argument. The 
main idea of the PMI is to go against the no-miracle argu-
ment. The claim is that it is not the case that the empirical 
success of a theory is a reliable indicator of its truth: since 
past theories were empirically successful but turned out to be 
false, it follows that our current theories, even if successful, 
are more likely to be false than true.
One way to respond to the PMI challenge is to argue that one 
should be a realist about a restricted set of entities, not about 
the whole theory. This is what Psillos calls a divide et impera 
strategy: scientific realists may argue that “when a theory is 
abandoned, its theoretical constituents, i.e. the theoretical 
mechanisms and laws posited, should not be rejected en bloc. 
Some of those theoretical constituents are inconsistent with 
what we now accept, and therefore they have to be rejected. 
But not all are. Some of them have been retained as essential 
constituents of subsequent theories” (Psillos 1999, p. 108). 
Therefore, if one can show that the entities that are retained 
in moving from one theory to the next are the ones that are 
responsible for the empirical success of the theory, the PMI 
is blocked. By restricting realism one provides an alternative 
explanation for the success of past false-but-successful theo-
ries:  past theories were successful not because they were (ap-
proximately) true in their entirety, but because some parts of 
them were. If these true constituents of past theories are re-
sponsible for the theories’ success and they are carried over in 
theory change, then we are justified in believing that the en-
tities these theoretical constituents represent exist in reality.
 
There are various ways to restrict realism. One example is 
Worrall’s structural realism (Worrall 1989), according to 
which the PMI is correct in saying that in theory change we 
often have discontinuity at the level of unobservable enti-
ties, but most of the mathematical content of the old theory 
carries over to the new one. Therefore, the scientific realist 
may not be justified in believing what the theory says about 
the nature of physical objects. Nonetheless she is justified 
in believing that the structure that holds between these ob-
jects which is preserved in theory change is (approximately) 
true. There are different varieties of structural realism, a first 
rough distinction is the one between epistemic structural re-
alism and ontic structural realism. In the epistemic version, 
which some attribute to Worrall himself, we are only justified 
in believing that objects stand in certain structural relations 
with one another. Ontic structural realism instead goes fur-
ther and claims that the very notion of objects is problem-
atic and is worth dismissing (French 1998; Ladyman 1998). 
There are other responses to the PMI argument, but in this 
paper, I will focus on explanationism, developed most prom-
inently by Kitcher (1993) and Psillos (1999). They distinguish 
between ‘working’ and ‘presuppositional’ posits of a theory. 
The working posits are the ones that are responsible for the 
theory’s empirical success, while the presuppositional posits 
are theoretical constituents needed to complete the theory. If 
the working posits are preserved during theory change, the 
argument goes, one could argue that past theories were suc-
cessful because they got something right, namely the working 
posits. At the same time, when considered in their entirety, 
these theories are also false since they got something wrong 
too, namely the presuppositional posits. Thus, the advocate 
of realism is justified in believing in the reality of the working 
posits, but there is no need for her to commit to the existence 
of the presuppositional posits: they are just ‘idle’ compo-
nents, which make no difference to the theory’s success.
3 – The Classical-to-Quantum 
Theory Change as a Problem 
for Explanationism 
Scientific realism has been motivated and discussed almost 
exclusively in the classical framework, discussing theories 
other than quantum mechanics. In particular, Psillos and 
Kitcher argue for explanationism within Fresnel’s theory of 
light. It was successful because it got the working posit right, 
namely the electromagnetic waves: they are responsible for 
the success of the theory, and they were preserved by Max-
well’s electrodynamics. In contrast, ether was a presupposi-
tional posit: the success of Fresnel’s theory did not depend on 
it, and it was abandoned by the subsequent theory. Realists 
are therefore justified in believing that electromagnetic waves 
exist, but do not have to be committed to believe that ether 
exists too. Another example extensively discussed in the lit-
erature is the caloric theory of heat, or phlogiston’s theory of 
combustion, to again arrive at the conclusion that caloric and 
phlogiston are presuppositional posits. In reply, these histor-
ical examples have been revisited with the intent of arguing 
that ether, caloric, phlogiston, and the like, contrary to what 
it is maintained by explanationism, played an important role 
in the success of past theories (see, e.g. Psillos (1994), Chang 
(2003), Elsamahi (2005)).
 
Regardless of the outcome of the debate over these examples, 
I think that the main threat to explanationism comes from the 
classical-to-quantum transition. The fact that the discussion 
was limited to classical theories is not surprising: quantum 
mechanics has been considered, for a long time, incompati-
ble with scientific realism. While, on the one hand, quantum 
theory is incredibly powerful in making new and very pre-
cise predictions, on the other hand it is extremely difficult to 
understand and ‘make sense’ of. Indeed, quantum mechanics 
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has been taken by many to suggest that physical objects have 
contradictory properties, like being in a place and not being 
in that place at the same time, or that properties do not exist 
at all independently of observation. Given that, many have 
thought that the real lesson of quantum mechanics is that sci-
entific realism is untenable. Luckily for the realist ,the situa-
tion has changed: today we have various proposals of quan-
tum theories that allow for a realist reading. Among these 
theories, most famously, we find Bohmian mechanics (Bohm 
1952), Everettian quantum mechanics , or many-worlds the-
ory (Everett 1957), and the GRW theory (Ghirardi, Rimini & 
Weber 1986). They are empirically adequate fundamental 
quantum theories according to which there is an objective 
physical world, which can be described by non-contradictory, 
mind-independent properties.
 
Nonetheless, even in this framework the examples from quan-
tum mechanics are brought up to motivate ontic structural 
realism rather than explanationism: “[what] we have learned 
from contemporary physics is that the nature of space, time 
and matter are not compatible with standard metaphysical 
views about the ontological relationship between individu-
als, intrinsic properties and relations” (Ladyman 2014). Most 
importantly, in quantum mechanics we have the Schrödinger 
equation, which is the equation for the temporal evolution 
of the wave function. The wave function is an object which is 
involved in the derivation of most, if not all, predictions and 
explanations the theory is able to provide. Thus, in the frame-
work provided by explanationism, it seems one should regard 
the wave function as a working posit of quantum theory. If so, 
though, explanationist realism is not able to defeat the PMI, 
since the wave function arguably does not have any classi-
cal analog and therefore we have radical discontinuity in the 
classical-to-quantum theory change. This is bad news, since 
the case for explanationism has no hope of being compelling 
if it does not cover quantum mechanics. In the next section, 
though, I show how explanationist realism can be extended 
to quantum theories if paired with a particular view about the 
metaphysics of quantum mechanics, namely the primitive 
ontology (PO) approach.
4 – Primitive Ontology 
Most philosophers of physics recognize the legitimacy of 
Bohmian mechanics, Everettian theory and GRW, but dis-
agree about the metaphysical pictures these theories provide. 
In this section, I discuss the PO approach. In the next section 
I argue that all these theories have a primitive ontology such 
that: (1) it is primarily responsible for the theory’s success; 
and (2) it (suitably) carries over during theory change. If so, 
and assuming that a strategy like explanationism is success-
ful in defending scientific realism, the PMI is blocked: the 
advocate of realism is justified in believing that the PO is real 
because it does all the work to explain the empirical success 
of theories and it is (suitably) preserved in theory change.
 
Here is a brief summary of the PO account (Allori et al. 2008; 
Allori 2013). Arguably, classical theories such as Newtonian 
mechanics, classical electrodynamics and statistical mechan-
ics share a common way of understanding how fundamental 
physical theories account for the behavior of macroscopic 
phenomena. The reason is that all these theories possess a 
PO:  some variable in three-dimensional space (or four-di-
mensional space-time) that represent physical objects. For 
classical theories, the PO was point-particles.1 If we wish to 
preserve such a common framework, then any other funda-
mental physical theory should have a PO as well. The prim-
itive variables in the quantum theories proposed so far in 
the literature include point-particles, continuous fields, and 
spatio-temporal events or ‘flashes.’ For instance, Bohmian 
mechanics is a theory with a particle PO (Dürr, Goldstein and 
Zanghí 1992), GRWm is a theory in which matter is described 
by a continuous (three-dimensional) matter field localized 
where the macroscopic objects are (Benatti, Ghirardi and 
Grassi 1995), while GRWf is a theory of ‘flashes,’ spatio-tem-
poral events (Bell 1987, Tumulka 2006).2 In addition of spec-
ifying what matter is, we need to specify how it behaves. This 
is implemented by the so-called non-primitive variables, 
most importantly by the wave function. The fundamental 
idea is that the wave function does not represent material 
things, but rather determines how material things move. On 
the one hand, the wave function is a necessary ingredient to 
implement the law of temporal evolution of the PO (Allori 
2013). For instance, in Bohmian mechanics the wave func-
tion evolves according to the Schrödinger equation, while in 
GRWf and GRWm it evolves according to the Schrödinger 
equation and then randomly collapses, following the so-called 
GRW evolution. In Bohmian mechanics the wave function 
generates the spatio-temporal trajectories of the PO through 
an equation appropriately dubbed the guide equation. Simi-
larly, in GRWm, with a different equation, the wave function 
generates the spatio-temporal behavior of the mass-density 
field.  In GRWf, the wave function enters in the probability 
distribution of the flashes, and therefore determines where 
they are located in space-time. In this sense, the wave func-
tion is involved in the predictions and in the explanation of 
the phenomena. Nonetheless, on the other hand, the PO is 
the one that makes direct contact with the phenomena and 
is ultimately responsible for explanations and predictions. In 
fact, one of the important features of the PO approach is its 
architectural component: on the foundation there is the PO, 
the building block of everything else, and then there are lay-
ers of other entities, each of which acquires its significance 
and its role in the theory via the way they affect the PO. They 
contribute generating the empirically adequate trajectories of 
the PO which ultimately play the explanatory role. The wave 
function should be thought as belonging to this latter catego-
ry of entities: it helps the PO to explain and to predict, but it 
is not ultimately responsible for these things. 
 
Here are some fundamental features of the PO approach that 
is crucial to articulate:
1. REDUCTIONISM with respect to the PO. In this ap-
proach, macroscopic objects are thought to be funda-
mentally composed of the microscopic entities the PO 
specifies. As such, the PO approach is (ontologically) 
reductionist, at least to the extent that it allows to make 
sense of claims like the PO being “the building blocks of 
everything else,” and of the idea that macroscopic regu-
larities are obtained entirely from the microscopic tra-
1 - For the case of classical electrodynamics, see Allori (2015). 
2 - For other examples, see Allori et al (2008), and Allori et al (2011).
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jectories of the PO. 
2. EXPLANATION and PO. The PO explains the macro-
scopic regularities using reductionist approaches similar 
to those used in classical mechanics. In fact, in classical 
mechanics, macroscopic bodies are made of a collection 
of particles, and their properties are accounted for in 
terms of the interaction of these particles among each 
other and the particles of the environment. For instance, 
the transparency of a pair of glasses is explained in terms 
of the electromagnetic forces acting between the parti-
cles composing the glasses, which are such that incoming 
light rays will pass through them (Halliday and Resnick 
1962). Similarly, the PO grounds the explanatory schema 
of quantum theories: the properties of macroscopic ob-
jects are (in principle) accounted for in terms of the PO’s 
behavior (Allori 2013).
3. THEOREITICAL VIRTUES. The PO of a theory is pos-
tulated, rather than inferred from the formalism, on the 
basis of some super-empirical virtues such as simplicity, 
explanatory power, and unification. The PO that pro-
vides the simplest, most unifying explanation should be 
selected (Allori 2015).
4. UNDERDETERMINATION of the WAVE FUNCTION. 
The way the wave function evolves in time is irrelevant 
as long as the law of the PO such a wave function defines 
remains the same. That is, a theory of particles which fol-
low certain trajectories, such as Bohmian mechanics, can 
be obtained by a Schrödinger-evolving wave function, as 
in the usual formulation, but also in terms of a collapsed 
wave function (Allori et al. 2008). Two theories with 
the same trajectories for the PO, regardless of how they 
have been obtained (i.e., via a Schrödinger evolving wave 
function or not) are physically equivalent. Since differ-
ent wave functions can give rise to the same trajectories 
for the PO, and since the trajectories of the PO are the 
ones that account for the macroscopic regularities, the 
wave function evolution is underdetermined by the data. 
Because of this, the same trajectories of the PO do not 
uniquely pick out a wave function. Indeed, it is possible 
to try to eliminate the wave function completely, as some 
have tried (Dowker and Herbauts 2006; Norsen 2010).
5. PREDICTIONS and PO. Once the PO and its law of evo-
lution have been chosen, everything else is determined, 
including the empirical predictions which are deter-
mined as a function of the PO. The wave function ap-
pears into the derivation of the predictions of the theo-
ry, but its role is not essential, since the way in which it 
specifies the law of the PO is underdetermined (Allori et 
al. 2014). 
5 – Quantum Mechanics and 
Explanationism 
I wish to argue now that the PO can be identified with the 
working posit of quantum mechanics, while the wave function 
is best seen as a presuppositional posit. In fact, as discussed 
in (5) in the list in the previous section, the predictions are 
determined by the PO, not by the wave function. It appears in 
the derivation but its evolution is underdetermined by data, 
as argued in (4). In addition, as pointed out in (2), explana-
tion is in terms of the PO: this reminds one of Kitcher’s idea 
that working posits are the entities that play a fundamental 
role in the theory’s explanatory schemata. Moreover, there is 
the explicit fundamental postulation that the PO represent 
matter, while the wave function does not, and that everything 
is made of the entities the PO specifies, as outlined in (1). All 
primitive ontologists (or supporters of suitably related views) 
maintain that one should be a realist about the PO, regard-
less of what they think the wave function really is. In fact, 
it has been considered to be, among other things, a law-like 
object (Goldstein  and  Zanghí 2013), a disposition (Esfeld 
et al. 2014), a property (Monton 2006), or a new kind entity 
(Maudlin 2013). Some others have denied, in line with the 
Humean tradition, an ontological status of the wave function, 
taking it to be a parameter that supervenes on the Humean 
mosaic that is provided by the PO (Bhogal & Perry 2015; Cal-
lender 2015; Esfeld 2014, Miller 2014). Nonetheless, I ague, 
one can be ‘metaphysically neutral’ with respect to the wave 
function: one does not need to commit to the existence or 
non-existence of the wave function in order to account for the 
success of the theory. But this is to say that the PO is a work-
ing posit, while the wave function is a presuppositional posit 
of quantum theories. If so, the PO approach provides a very 
nice framework for the explanationist to extend her view in 
the quantum domain.
 
Assuming the arguments in the previous sections are sound, 
we have made good progress. However, this is not enough to 
successfully reply to the PMI: one would also have to show 
that the PO is preserved during theory change. What is the PO 
of classical mechanics? Arguably, in classical mechanics mat-
ter is made of particles, objects with the fundamental proper-
ty of having a position in three-dimensional space. Therefore, 
for quantum theories of particles like Bohmian mechanics, 
the preservation of PO during the classical-to-quantum the-
ory change is obvious. The interesting cases are the ones that 
involve a matter density PO and a flash PO. In both cases, 
literally, the PO of classical mechanics has not straightfor-
wardly carried over.
 
There seems to be two options: either dispute that these are 
cases of radical discontinuity, or take this to be an argument 
against a non-particle PO. I think the latter: particles are the 
simplest PO, and I do not see why one would make things 
complicated if there is no need. If you add to this that par-
ticles make it easier to defeat the PMI, then the case is even 
more straightforward. Nonetheless, some may argue that is 
not true that a particle PO is not enough mentioning that 
‘flashy’ theories like GRWf are more compatible with relativ-
ity than particle theories like Bohmian mechanics (Tumulka 
2006). I think this is not necessarily the case, as relativistic, 
non-artificial particle quantum theories have been proposed 
(Dürr et al. 1998). Be that as it may, one could also argue 
that the classical-to-quantum change in PO from particles to 
non-particles is not a case of radical discontinuity after all. 
In fact, while it is not true that there are particles, it is still 
the case that there is ‘stuff’ in three-dimensional space. In 
other words, we did not bet correctly on the nature of objects 
in classical mechanics since we believed there were particles 
while actually there are not. Nonetheless, the assumption 
that there are three-dimensional entities is left unaffected, 
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and there is a sense in which this non-particle three-dimen-
sional ‘stuff’ behave as if it were a particle.  Let me elaborate. 
Consider the case in which people went from believing that 
atoms are indivisible to believe that they are made of other 
indivisible particles. The old theory got right that there are 
particles, but it was wrong about what the fundamental parti-
cles really were. The situation here is different: we move from 
a theory in which the fundamental entities are particles, to a 
theory in which the fundamental entities have another na-
ture. This is, arguably, what would happen from a quantum 
theory of particles to string theory. In this case we are not get-
ting the nature of the fundamental entities right: before we 
had one-dimensional particles, now we have bi-dimensional 
vibrating loops.  However, if we ‘squint,’ then we don’t see the 
fine-grained details, and we take strings to be particles. They 
are, for all explanatory purposes, particles: we explain the 
macroscopic regularities in terms of the PO, namely three-di-
mensional ‘stuff’, ignoring the details about what its real na-
ture actually is. This is similar to the case in which we observe 
a hose from a distance and we think it is one-dimensional 
while it is actually two-dimensional, or when we look at a 
poster in the subway and we think it’s a homogenous image 
when it is actually a collection of colored dots. At the level of 
microphysics we may have flashes or a continuous field, but 
at some mesoscopic level they produce trajectories as if they 
are produced by particles. So, even if the microscopic PO is 
not one of particles, there is a mesoscopic scale in which they 
behave as if they are in the sense that from that level up to 
the macroscopic level the explanation is the same as if they 
were particles.   
Notice that this option is not available to the wave function 
realist. In fact, one might think that she could argue along 
the very same lines I just did by saying: “we do not get the 
nature of objects right because we believe they are composed 
of particles in classical mechanics and then we discover they 
are actually, say, patterns in the wave function; but we get 
something right, namely that on some mesoscopic level they 
behave as if their nature were the one of particles.” The dis-
analogy between this and my argument is that in the latter 
what is crucial is the existence of microscopic patterns at 
the fundamental level in three-dimensional space. It is only 
because the fundamental objects described by the PO are 
in such space that we can ‘squint’ and recover the familiar 
macroscopic world. In contrast, in the world described by 
wave function realism one needs to do much more than mere 
‘squinting.’ Indeed, it is unclear what is necessary to do from 
the highly-dimensional fundamental space to the three-di-
mensional world of our experiences: different approaches 
have been proposed, and they are all works in progress (see 
most notably (Albert 2013, 2015); (Lewis 2013); (Ney 2015, 
2017, forthcoming); (North 2013)).  In connection to this, a 
well-known argument against wave function realism is the 
so-called macro-object problem, namely that wave function 
realism cannot account for three-dimensional objects (Mon-
ton 2002; Maudlin 2007; Allori 2013). Note that my remark 
is different: even if the wave function realist would be able 
to account for them, the explanation would have to rely on 
totally new mechanisms. In fact, while the PO approach can 
rely on compositionality and reductionism techniques, this is 
not the case within wave function realism (see Allori (2013) 
for a similar remark, and Ney (2017) and reference therein 
for a presentation of some of the new strategies and what is 
required by them).
6 – Possible Objections and 
Replies 
One could object that it is wrongheaded to think the wave 
function is not a working posit of quantum mechanics. In 
fact, in Kitcher’s characterization, the working posits are the 
ones that are indispensable for the explanation of the phe-
nomena. Therefore, one may think that the wave function is 
exactly that: it is needed to make contact with the experimen-
tal predictions just as well as the PO. It helps explain why the 
particle, say, goes this way rather than that way in a magnetic 
field just as well as the PO. Hence, the wave function is not 
a working posit but a presuppositional posit.3 As a reply, I 
think the correct way to think about the wave function is that 
it is not needed in the same way as the PO, neither to make 
contact with the phenomena nor to explain them. In fact, re-
member the architectural structure of the PO approach: in 
contrast with the PO, the wave function is not at the founda-
tion of a theory and, even if it helps the PO explain and  pre-
dict, it is not what is ultimately responsible for these things. 
Another objection could be that the chosen example makes 
things too easy for the PO approach. In fact, the particle PO 
is carried over from classical to quantum mechanics by con-
struction, so the question I explore is either not very interest-
ing or has no great significance. In contrast, I should ask what 
is the PO of, say, phlogiston theory and give a good reason 
why the PO of phlogiston theory does not include phlogiston.4 
The same could be true for ether as well as for caloric. The is-
sue has been discussed without reference to the PO and, as al-
ready pointed out in Section 3, people have argued that ether, 
caloric and phlogiston are not among the working posits of 
the theory. If these arguments are convincing, then one may 
safely claim that ether, caloric and phlogiston are not the PO 
of these theories either. To elaborate a little, one may point 
out that, as Psillos (1994) does, the caloric theory of heat does 
not contain the material representation of heat as a working 
hypothesis. Rather, what is relevant is the quantity of heat, 
which does not need to have any referent. In addition, Psillos 
denies the holistic theory of confirmation according to which 
all assumptions of a theory are equally likely to be true. In 
this way, even if caloric theory was successful and regarded 
as true, it did not imply that caloric had necessarily to exist 
as a material entity. Phlogiston theory presupposed the exis-
tence of an element, phlogiston, contained within bodies and 
released during combustion.  As it is known, it was replaced 
by oxidation theory, according to which combustion gives 
out nothing, but rather oxygen is taken in. I will not pursue 
here historical research, like Psillos did for caloric, regarding 
whether contemporary scientists were cautious or not regard-
ing the existence of a material phlogiston. Be that as it may, 
it seems to me that what was argued for caloric applies here 
too: what matters is that something was exchanged, and ex-
periments later revealed it was taken in rather than given out, 
3 - I owe this objection to Kevin Coffey in his comments to my paper at the Pacific APA (April 2017). 
4 - I am thankful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out to me.
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as postulated by the phlogiston theory. In the case of ether, 
the situation is slightly more complicated but analysis leads 
to the result that ether is a working posit.  One may think of 
classical electrodynamics as a theory with different possible 
POs (Allori 2015). Among them, classical electrodynamics 
could be taken to be a theory with a particle PO where the 
electromagnetic fields are treated as non-primitive variables. 
In this case ether, as well as the electromagnetic fields, is by 
definition a working posit, namely something that is need-
ed to account for the phenomena but never the phenomena 
themselves. Alternatively, one could think of classical fields 
as part of the PO together with the charged particles, and 
also in this case ether would just be part of the ingredients to 
explain macroscopic regularities, and thus a working posit. 
Thus, it seems unwarranted to think of caloric, phlogiston or 
ether as part of the PO of the respective theories: the PO is 
given by the relevant theory, namely Newtonian mechanics 
or classical electrodynamics. Then the behavior of such PO is 
refined by experiments and formalized in subsequent theo-
ries: kinetic theory, oxygen theory and relativity.
 
In addition, an anonymous referee has suggested that ‘flashy’ 
theories are not so easy to accommodate in the squinting ar-
gument I elaborated above, since there may be situations in 
which no amount of squinting will allow us to recover par-
ticle-like behavior from the behavior of flashes. The referee 
gives the example of a beta-particle in a cloud chamber. Ac-
cording to GRWf, the beta-particle itself will on average flash 
only once in 108 years. The ‘particle’ track is accounted for 
by flashes of the surrounding gas particles. Then according 
to the referee one could conclude that “if the beta particle is 
to play any role in this explanation (as it does in the classi-
cal picture), it is entirely due to its wave function; its flashes 
(even in the very improbable case that there is one) are com-
pletely irrelevant.” I believe this conclusion is unwarranted 
and seems to rely on missing some crucial ingredient of the 
PO account. In fact, the flashes are not irrelevant: they are the 
things drawing the track of the beta-particle. The wave func-
tion determines the distribution of the flashes in space-time, 
and as such contribute to explain why the track looks one way 
rather than another. However one should not overestimate 
this explanation, which would be empty without the PO.
 
One, perhaps more interesting observation is the following: 
isn’t my proposal just some sort of (ontic) structuralism? If 
we do not preserve the nature of ‘stuff,’ isn’t what we preserve 
some structural content of the theory? In replying to this, let 
me first make a clarification: if structuralism is the view that 
there is just structure and no objects as individuals, then 
clearly not, since the PO approach postulates the existence 
of objects as a starting point. Instead, what about a moderate 
version of ontic structural realism, like the one proposed by 
Esfeld (2004)? The idea behind this view is something like 
this: one should be a realist about structure but, in contrast 
with the ‘eliminativist’ ontic structuralism mentioned above, 
there are ‘things’ (individuals) that stand in the relation the 
structure prescribes, even if they have no intrinsic identities. 
In the quantum domain, such structure is the wave function. 
Indeed, interestingly enough, Esfeld (2017) proposes that in 
his moderate ontic structuralism, the relata the wave func-
tion relates are given by the PO: he argues that the PO ap-
proach and his moderate ontic structuralism can help each 
other make sense of quantum non-locality and entangle-
ment. So, in his view, one should be a realist about the PO, 
and also about the structure that relates the PO, provided by 
the wave function. In this sense, the reading I provide of the 
PO approach is different: the strength of the PO approach in 
responding to the PMI is that it regards the wave function 
as a working posit. Only because of this, one can show there 
is continuity of PO during theory change. Instead, Esfeld’s 
moderate ontic structuralism in this ‘flat’ reading I have just 
provided does not have this advantage: if the wave function 
is the structure the advocate of realism should be committing 
to, then it is difficult to see where this structure was coming 
from in classical physics. In light of the fact that Esfeld (2014) 
has previously argued that the wave function should be just 
considered as part of the Humean mosaic, I think the best 
way to think about this approach is to emphasize the archi-
tectural component of the PO approach and re-read Esfeld’s 
moderate structuralism as non-flat. That is, one would main-
tain that the PO constitutes the foundation of the theory, 
while the relations (in which the wave function plays an im-
portant role) generate the macroscopic appearances through 
the PO. In this way, since the focus is on the PO, one need not 
think of the wave function as a working posit, and thus defeat 
the PMI. 
Let me close this section pointing out how the PO approach 
can help reply to one common objection to explanationism 
as originally proposed. The charge is that the distinction 
between working posits and presuppositional posits can be 
drawn only after one discovers that the original theory is 
false. That is, the working posits are what we see have carried 
over (see, e.g. Stanford (2003a, 2003b)), and this is problem-
atic because if one does not know what the presuppositional 
posits of the theory are, then one does not know what she is 
justified in believing.  In the PO framework this is not true. In 
fact, the PO is postulated when the theory is proposed, rath-
er than inferred from the formalism or selected post-hoc: it 
is the one that provides the best combination of simplicity, 
explanatory power and unification that is able to account for 
the experimental data. In this way, the working posits are se-
lected at the time the theory is proposed.
7 – An Argument for the PO 
Approach over Wave Function 
Realism based on Scientific 
Realism 
The above analysis also provides the PO approach with an 
important advantage over wave function realism. In fact, as 
I argue in this section, in contrast with being a realist about 
the PO, being a realist about the wave function may under-
mine the tenability of scientific realism itself in the quantum 
domain. Here is the reason. In the wave function ontology 
approach the wave function is a concrete physical field that 
represents matter. If we analyze this view in terms of expla-
nationism, the wave function is a working posit of quantum 
theory. The problem with this is that, mathematically, the 
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wave function is an object that lives in the high dimensional 
configuration space and as such is a very different entity from 
classical particles. In addition, the image of the world provid-
ed by wave function realism is very different from the image 
of the world given to us by classical mechanics: in the latter 
there are particles moving in three-dimensional space, in the 
former there is a matter field in a highly-dimensional space. 
In the classical-to-quantum transition we discover that not 
only we were getting the nature of objects wrong (we be-
lieved there were particles and actually there were none) but 
we cannot get our classical picture back by ‘squinting,’ like 
in the PO framework, since the fundamental physical space 
is not three-dimensional. In this way, there is no continuity 
of working posits between classical and quantum mechanics, 
and the strategy to resist to the PMI along the lines of expla-
nationism is precluded to the proponent of wave function re-
alism. If there is truly a quantum revolution, as wave function 
realism seems to maintain to a given extent (Allori 2015), and 
the way in which we understand the world using quantum 
theory is fundamentally different from the way in which we 
understood it in classical terms, then what is our justification 
to believe that the theoretical terms used in quantum me-
chanics are (approximately) true? 
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